New RUSI report: "The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence"

Highlights and some thoughts

RUSI published another highly interesting report by Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds and Dr Jack Watling on the Russian air war today.

Instead of a Twitter thread, I have decided to make my first Substack post on this topic.

All in all, I highly recommend reading the full report. You can find it here.

Based in large parts on on-the-ground interviews, the report delivers new details, and insights into the air war, thereby correcting the perception that the VKS effort has been somewhat ineffective, limited and delivered little effect.

This new perspective also demonstrates the limitations of what we can deduct, based on open source information, from afar.

Below I will highlight some of what I found most interesting in this report, starting with Part III.

The long range strike campaign

Statements by Western officials, most notably from the US, has created an impression that the reliability of Russian long-range PGMs has been low. This report paints a different picture.

Russian land-attack cruise missiles and ballistic missiles have performed well throughout the conflict, with most impacting within 3–10 m of their intended aiming points, except when degraded by Ukrainian electronic warfare assets.

To me, beyond the first week, Russian targeting has seemed incoherent and poorly planned. In line with what most analysts have said previously, the report states that the Russian targeting cycle has been too slow to cope with more than fixed targets.

This defect made the Russians switch to infrastructure and government targets in March, with little effect besides expending missiles, and against POL and railway targets in June. By June, Ukrainian air defences had become more effective.

Whereas during March and April interception rates had been around 20–30%, by mid-June they were roughly 50–60%.

We also get some data on Russian missile production

For example, the modernised 9M723 Iskander production line has a monthly output capacity of six missiles.

Russian industry has also opened a new production facility to recondition and return old stocks of Tochka-U ballistic missiles to usable condition to supplement dwindling 9M720/723 Iskander-M stocks and production capacity

On the current campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure, which has been more effective than I originally thought, in parts due to the Shahed-136s.

More worryingly, temporary blackouts that grow more frequent each day across many of Ukraine’s key cities after just three weeks of this new strike campaign suggest that it poses a major threat to Ukraine’s ability to keep its people warm and safe during the coming winter months

Scale and scope of air operations

The scale and scope of fixed wing operations was much bigger in the first weeks than what was visible through open sources.

At the start of the invasion, Russian Sukhoi Su-34 ‘frontal bomber’ and Su-30SM and Su-35S multi-role fighter aircraft flew around 140 sorties per day, conducting fighter sweeps and strike sorties up to 300 km inside Ukrainian territory at altitudes of between 12,000 ft and 30,000 ft.

During the first three days, the primary targets of these VKS strikes were Ukrainian air defences. Over 100 fixed long-range radar installations, bases, munitions storage sites and positions occupied by mobile long- and medium-range SAM systems were attacked, with Russian fixedwing sorties concentrating their activities along the routes intended to be used by airborne and helicopter assault forces.

SEAD - Details

Russian SEAD throughout the war has, to the open source observer seemed primitive and rudimentary, but that doesn't seem to be the case.

On SEAD, supported by EW, in the opening phase of the invasion.

During the first week of the invasion, Russian electronic warfare using jamming equipment and E-96M aerial decoys were highly effective in disrupting Ukrainian GBAD.12 S-300 and SA-11 ‘Buk’ radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were particularly badly affected in the north of the country, especially to the north of Kyiv along the Hostomel/Irpin and Chernihiv axes.

Cruise and ballistic missile strikes had also damaged or destroyed multiple long-range early warning radars throughout the country, and destroyed various Ukrainian SAM sites in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in the south.

Tactics when trying to bait Ukrainian SAMs.

To this end, their CAPs were used as bait to try to make Ukrainian SAM systems turn on their radars to fire at them. If SA-11s or other SAMs did try to engage them, the Flankers would fire Kh-31P and, later, older Kh-58 ARMs at long ranges to home in on the radar emissions, and then turn away.

Meanwhile Su-25 singles or pairs flown by experienced crews would fly in at low altitude to try to find and kill the SAM with rockets while it was suppressed

Counter air operations

Russian counter air operations has also remained effective throughout the war, and remain a serious threat to the Ukrainian Air Force. Largely due to the VKS operating more modern, and advanced aircraft than the Ukrainians.

Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.

On more recent operations:

However, these patrols have proven highly effective against Ukrainian attack aircraft and fighters, with the Mig-31BM and R-37M long-range airto-air missile being especially problematic. The VKS has been firing up to six R-37Ms per day during October, and the extremely high speed of the weapon, coupled with very long effective range and a seeker designed for engaging low-altitude targets, makes it particularly difficult to evade

Russian ground based air-defences

“What air-defence doing” has been a popular catchphrase, but the reality Ukrainian pilots have been, and are still facing, is different.

Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the longrange S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.

Command & control

The report also offers some interestingdetails on A-50M/U Mainstay (Russian AWACS) operations.

However, the effectiveness of A-50M as a force multiplier has been limited throughout the war by two factors. First, Ukrainian forces have found A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via electronic attack, and report consistent success in doing so.

Second, because the Russian air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD units such as S-400 batteries. Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the GBAD units and fighter patrols.

The report also includes a part on “The Need for More Western Aid to Improve Ukrainian Air Defence” which I won't cover today.

To sum up, this report by RUSI is highly interesting, both for professionals, and others interested Russian airpower, substantially improving the public knowledge and debate on this subject.

Regards

The Lookout