Thank you very much. I greatly appreciate these articles - they are very helpful indeed in assisting a non-expert person like me gain a better understanding of the course of the conflict.
Many also vastly overestimates the impact of long-range fires, saying that if Ukraine gets “x kilometers further south”, Russian supply-lines will become unsustainable. -> I agree with this for some russians' countermeasures against long-range strike resources, and their effort to reconstitute the logistics, and simply deploying more resources.
Also, Tatarigami_UA had mentioned about cost-effiency of long range fires, because they cannot shoot HIMARS for a single GAZ truck.
Something I've been wondering as this offensive unfolds regarding Russian defense operations - why are they conducting such an active/forward defence? Both sides seem to have accepted that attrition is king for the forseeable future, so why are the russians fighting for every inch and systematically counterattacking to such a high degree? I'm assuming that it's a more costly defense strategy than a proper defense in depth, which seems to be what they set themselves up for with their layered fortifications. That said, I don't know much about contemporary russian defense doctrine. Any thoughts?
I'm not sure why the Russians have chosen to defend forward instead of relying on a true defence in depth. One reason could be that the initial Ukrainian attacks showed that they actually could do it and be successful. Another could be pressure from the top to yield as little ground as possible. Active defense is a contemporary Russian concept and it might be what we are seeing.
Rob Lee and Michael Kofman writes about this and have some good thoughts in their latest article:
This approach is more costly and thus comes at risk. That's why I have been saying that one of the major unknowns is how the Russians will cope with prolonged attrition. They have reserves but they are not plentiful, nor do they have "unlimited" manpower.
It is likely that they think they will cope better with attrition than the Ukrainians and thus think they can stop the offensive, but attrition is hard to manage.
Thanks for the reply. I'd be curious to know to what degree russian defense operations have been consistent with their doctrine, and what their reasoning would be for adhering or deviating. The WotR guys seem understandably hesitant to speculate on russian reasoning beyond Gerasimov's incompetence/overconfidence. But, like you say, we can probably glean some insight from it regarding how they percieve their own state of attrition.
Been meaning to try my hand at writing articles... guess I'll research the topic and see where it goes
I am not surprised by the results. What did surprise me was all the talk about a summer offensive. Ukraine is the weaker player here. Ukraine enjoyed some success last fall because she fully mobilized and as a result enjoyed a numerical advantage of Russia at that time. But Russia mobilized an addition 300K troops who would be in place by summer and they would have time to dig in. And since they have drafted more.
In a war of attrition, how can Ukraine win? Won't they simply run out of men before the Russians do?
Many having too high expectations ahead of the offensive plays a part here.
It has been too easy getting fixated on Russian deficiencies and Ukrainian successes and by that missing the nuances. Both Kherson and Kharkiv were imperfect examples to look to and easy to interpret wrong. I also think many underestimated the Russians going into summer.
Tracking who is ahead in a war of attrition is difficult to determine and I think it was the Ukrainian Twitter user Tatarigami_UA that said a small Soviet army won't defeat a bigger Soviet army.
I do believe that if the Ukrainians can rectify some of their internal issues and with the right Western support, it is possible for them to liberate significant chuncks of territory.
However, as it stands now, I don't see the war ending even if Ukraine for the most part reaches the 1991 borders, hence me constantly advocating for the long war perspective.
There's no assurance for the victory, but Ukrainians must do everything against bigger country, and bigger army. I believe that's why The Lookout mentions about looking upcoming war trajectory - ukrainians must fix their mistakes, coordinate, and need help. The only way a smaller country to win the war against bigger country is committing less mistakes than the enemy.
You are suggesting to move some units to concentrate on Orikhiv. As simple as that! But what if russians mirror that and also concentrate their numerically superior force on Orikhiv?
Firstly, that axis has been prioritised anyways.
Secondly, what you have overlooked in this article is the much shorter distances between theatres of operations which Ukraine enjoys. That forces russians to defend everywhere and has allowed Ukraine to strike where least expected. Would be quite unwise to forgo such a huge advantage and concentrate on a single axis where the enemy is expecting you.
The Ukrainian main effort seems to be exactly where everyone expected it.
Ukraine will be taking a risk by shifting some units to the Orikhiv axis, but Russian offensive potential is limited too, so it is likely manageable.
By not making any changes, there's a real risk the Ukrainian offensive culminates without getting much further than today. That would allow the Russians to recover and dig in again.
As I see it, making the best of it by maintaining pressure on the Orikhiv axis is the best option going into winter.
Thank you very much. I greatly appreciate these articles - they are very helpful indeed in assisting a non-expert person like me gain a better understanding of the course of the conflict.
Many also vastly overestimates the impact of long-range fires, saying that if Ukraine gets “x kilometers further south”, Russian supply-lines will become unsustainable. -> I agree with this for some russians' countermeasures against long-range strike resources, and their effort to reconstitute the logistics, and simply deploying more resources.
Also, Tatarigami_UA had mentioned about cost-effiency of long range fires, because they cannot shoot HIMARS for a single GAZ truck.
Nice work with this piece.
Something I've been wondering as this offensive unfolds regarding Russian defense operations - why are they conducting such an active/forward defence? Both sides seem to have accepted that attrition is king for the forseeable future, so why are the russians fighting for every inch and systematically counterattacking to such a high degree? I'm assuming that it's a more costly defense strategy than a proper defense in depth, which seems to be what they set themselves up for with their layered fortifications. That said, I don't know much about contemporary russian defense doctrine. Any thoughts?
I'm not sure why the Russians have chosen to defend forward instead of relying on a true defence in depth. One reason could be that the initial Ukrainian attacks showed that they actually could do it and be successful. Another could be pressure from the top to yield as little ground as possible. Active defense is a contemporary Russian concept and it might be what we are seeing.
Rob Lee and Michael Kofman writes about this and have some good thoughts in their latest article:
https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/perseverance-and-adaptation-ukraines-counteroffensive-at-three-months/
This approach is more costly and thus comes at risk. That's why I have been saying that one of the major unknowns is how the Russians will cope with prolonged attrition. They have reserves but they are not plentiful, nor do they have "unlimited" manpower.
It is likely that they think they will cope better with attrition than the Ukrainians and thus think they can stop the offensive, but attrition is hard to manage.
Thanks for the reply. I'd be curious to know to what degree russian defense operations have been consistent with their doctrine, and what their reasoning would be for adhering or deviating. The WotR guys seem understandably hesitant to speculate on russian reasoning beyond Gerasimov's incompetence/overconfidence. But, like you say, we can probably glean some insight from it regarding how they percieve their own state of attrition.
Been meaning to try my hand at writing articles... guess I'll research the topic and see where it goes
I am not surprised by the results. What did surprise me was all the talk about a summer offensive. Ukraine is the weaker player here. Ukraine enjoyed some success last fall because she fully mobilized and as a result enjoyed a numerical advantage of Russia at that time. But Russia mobilized an addition 300K troops who would be in place by summer and they would have time to dig in. And since they have drafted more.
In a war of attrition, how can Ukraine win? Won't they simply run out of men before the Russians do?
Many having too high expectations ahead of the offensive plays a part here.
It has been too easy getting fixated on Russian deficiencies and Ukrainian successes and by that missing the nuances. Both Kherson and Kharkiv were imperfect examples to look to and easy to interpret wrong. I also think many underestimated the Russians going into summer.
Tracking who is ahead in a war of attrition is difficult to determine and I think it was the Ukrainian Twitter user Tatarigami_UA that said a small Soviet army won't defeat a bigger Soviet army.
I do believe that if the Ukrainians can rectify some of their internal issues and with the right Western support, it is possible for them to liberate significant chuncks of territory.
However, as it stands now, I don't see the war ending even if Ukraine for the most part reaches the 1991 borders, hence me constantly advocating for the long war perspective.
There's no assurance for the victory, but Ukrainians must do everything against bigger country, and bigger army. I believe that's why The Lookout mentions about looking upcoming war trajectory - ukrainians must fix their mistakes, coordinate, and need help. The only way a smaller country to win the war against bigger country is committing less mistakes than the enemy.
Thank you. Clear eyed and succinct.
You are suggesting to move some units to concentrate on Orikhiv. As simple as that! But what if russians mirror that and also concentrate their numerically superior force on Orikhiv?
Firstly, that axis has been prioritised anyways.
Secondly, what you have overlooked in this article is the much shorter distances between theatres of operations which Ukraine enjoys. That forces russians to defend everywhere and has allowed Ukraine to strike where least expected. Would be quite unwise to forgo such a huge advantage and concentrate on a single axis where the enemy is expecting you.
The Ukrainian main effort seems to be exactly where everyone expected it.
Ukraine will be taking a risk by shifting some units to the Orikhiv axis, but Russian offensive potential is limited too, so it is likely manageable.
By not making any changes, there's a real risk the Ukrainian offensive culminates without getting much further than today. That would allow the Russians to recover and dig in again.
As I see it, making the best of it by maintaining pressure on the Orikhiv axis is the best option going into winter.