In my article I say atleast 3 brigades, so let's turn that into umbers.
Current announced IFV deliveries, Bradley's, Marders and CV90s stand at about 200.
If we say 50 pr battalion, not 100% sure on Ukrainian TOE, that' gives us 4 battalions with Western IFVs. A pre February 24th Ukrainian Mechanized Brigade had 3 mech battalions, so in total that's under half of my estimated requirement. Then there will be losses that would need replacements.
Also, I reckon a grouping of 3 - 4 brigades with Western equipment would be needed as a spearhead for an offensive in a single direction, concentration of forces, if Ukraine were to have a chance of transitioning to more mobile warfare. So far, mobile operations has only been possible against thinly held lines. The Russian mobilization has increased force density significantly, so that's why I think a slow, grinding fight is more likely than a breakthrough when a Ukrainian offensives comes.
It's often easy to overlook the sheer scale of the fighting and the distances involved in this war.
I've been running the same numbers and coming up with the same general conclusion.
Unless, as with artillery brigades, Ukraine augments existing brigades with the incoming modern gear. Given how the territorial guard units attach a battalion to regular brigades, I wonder if the fact Ukraine is forming 8 offensive guard brigades means it also plans 8 mechanized brigades, each with a single battalion of around 30 western tanks as a spearhead or counterattack core along with another infantry battalion or two with modern IFVs.
Logistics hell, I'd think, but Ukraine's loggie folks are apparently all effing gods.
Oh, and fair to anticipate new AFV deliveries will double between now and the end of April. Seems to be the pattern set by artillery - first Ukraine gets a token amount, then winds up with triple that.
Wow, glad I'm moving most of my own analysis of the war to Substack. This is 1000% better than almost anything I've found on Medium.
Also good to see I'm not entirely alone in my evaluation of Russia's need to open a new front, if it can. Starting to look like it's too late for this to play out, but in theory Moscow might just be nutty enough to play 'seven days to the river Dnipro' west of Kharkiv with whatever strategic reserve has been built up.
But, it is beginning to look like Putin may instead be planning a forever war rather than risk a 'one last big push' scenario that could lead to thousands of prisoners and renewed pressure from hard right nationalists to do some nuclear signaling, maybe after Enerhodar has a minor meltdown Russia blames on Kyiv.
Regardless, dear western leaders: stop holding back. Open the arsenals. Worry about China later.
That rapid advances, by any side, only has been possible against thinly manned lines is why I think the Russians need to open new fronts if they are to achieve their war aims. To have any reasonable chance of success they need to stretch the Ukrainians. This is, as of today, likely beyond their capabilities and it remains to be seen if the Kremlin and the General Staff sees the situation the same way.
By continuing to feed reserves into the current grinder, any such moves is pushed further into the future and gives the Ukrainians time to execute their own plans.
On the ammo side, 125mm tank rounds will likely also eventually become an issue though I have no idea of what the current status is.
As for further mobilization, I am of the opinion that the Russians will be able to do waves of 200k - 250k. They are trying to fix the issues that surfaced in the fall. Yes, there will be shortfalls in equipment, training, officers and NCOs but that's partly the nature of industrial scale warfare.
By Western peacetime standards, the training Ukrainian replacements gets is also short and over time, attrition will reduce the number of long serving, experienced men and officers. That's why Western training assistance also is vital and should be ramped up.
What are the numbers of Bradley's marders and other we specifically need to see to expect a successful offensive?
In my article I say atleast 3 brigades, so let's turn that into umbers.
Current announced IFV deliveries, Bradley's, Marders and CV90s stand at about 200.
If we say 50 pr battalion, not 100% sure on Ukrainian TOE, that' gives us 4 battalions with Western IFVs. A pre February 24th Ukrainian Mechanized Brigade had 3 mech battalions, so in total that's under half of my estimated requirement. Then there will be losses that would need replacements.
Also, I reckon a grouping of 3 - 4 brigades with Western equipment would be needed as a spearhead for an offensive in a single direction, concentration of forces, if Ukraine were to have a chance of transitioning to more mobile warfare. So far, mobile operations has only been possible against thinly held lines. The Russian mobilization has increased force density significantly, so that's why I think a slow, grinding fight is more likely than a breakthrough when a Ukrainian offensives comes.
It's often easy to overlook the sheer scale of the fighting and the distances involved in this war.
I've been running the same numbers and coming up with the same general conclusion.
Unless, as with artillery brigades, Ukraine augments existing brigades with the incoming modern gear. Given how the territorial guard units attach a battalion to regular brigades, I wonder if the fact Ukraine is forming 8 offensive guard brigades means it also plans 8 mechanized brigades, each with a single battalion of around 30 western tanks as a spearhead or counterattack core along with another infantry battalion or two with modern IFVs.
Logistics hell, I'd think, but Ukraine's loggie folks are apparently all effing gods.
Oh, and fair to anticipate new AFV deliveries will double between now and the end of April. Seems to be the pattern set by artillery - first Ukraine gets a token amount, then winds up with triple that.
Wow, glad I'm moving most of my own analysis of the war to Substack. This is 1000% better than almost anything I've found on Medium.
Also good to see I'm not entirely alone in my evaluation of Russia's need to open a new front, if it can. Starting to look like it's too late for this to play out, but in theory Moscow might just be nutty enough to play 'seven days to the river Dnipro' west of Kharkiv with whatever strategic reserve has been built up.
But, it is beginning to look like Putin may instead be planning a forever war rather than risk a 'one last big push' scenario that could lead to thousands of prisoners and renewed pressure from hard right nationalists to do some nuclear signaling, maybe after Enerhodar has a minor meltdown Russia blames on Kyiv.
Regardless, dear western leaders: stop holding back. Open the arsenals. Worry about China later.
That rapid advances, by any side, only has been possible against thinly manned lines is why I think the Russians need to open new fronts if they are to achieve their war aims. To have any reasonable chance of success they need to stretch the Ukrainians. This is, as of today, likely beyond their capabilities and it remains to be seen if the Kremlin and the General Staff sees the situation the same way.
By continuing to feed reserves into the current grinder, any such moves is pushed further into the future and gives the Ukrainians time to execute their own plans.
On the ammo side, 125mm tank rounds will likely also eventually become an issue though I have no idea of what the current status is.
As for further mobilization, I am of the opinion that the Russians will be able to do waves of 200k - 250k. They are trying to fix the issues that surfaced in the fall. Yes, there will be shortfalls in equipment, training, officers and NCOs but that's partly the nature of industrial scale warfare.
By Western peacetime standards, the training Ukrainian replacements gets is also short and over time, attrition will reduce the number of long serving, experienced men and officers. That's why Western training assistance also is vital and should be ramped up.