The coming winter
Some thoughts on the months ahead of us.
Kherson
Withdrawal announcement
The Russian forces on the West bank of the Dnipro has been in a difficult position since this summer, and their difficulties has steadily increased due to the Ukrainian slow-grind counter offensive. This has been a long, hard fought battle for the Ukrainians, facing stiff Russian resistance. Most analysts have believed this operation would end with Ukraine pushing the Russians back across the river, however I wouldn't declare this battle as over yet.
There are still many unknowns regarding the announced Russian withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro. There have been some signs that Russia started the process some weeks back, while on the other hand, Ukrainian officials were sceptical to the announcement.
Regardless, it is likely that a significant number of Russian troops still remains west of the river.
For the Russian side, achieving an orderly withdrawal is critical. The purpose of their withdrawal is highly likely to preserve their units for use elsewhere. Ukraine has a good opportunity to turn the withdrawal into a debacle, inflicting serious losses on Russian units that have preformed relatively well.
After a withdrawal
Regardless of how it transpires, a Russian withdrawal to the east bank will change the situation on the operational level.
Russia has been constructing multiple defensive lines on the east bank, including on the Perekop Isthmus.
A large river crossing operation is a very complex undertaking, so I do believe an Ukrainian attempt to do so, on its own, is unlikely in the coming months. What I do find more likely, is that the withdrawal will enable both sides to redeploy forces to other sectors of the front. This will create a new dynamic, with offering several possible outcomes.
Will Ukraine concentrate forces for a winter offensive, e.g in Zaporizhzhia? Will Russia attempt something similar, e.g Donetsk Oblast? I'll leave these questions open.
The Russian mobilization and potential “new" fronts.
While the Russian mobilization is chaotic, messy and often ridiculed, one cannot write it of a inconsequential. It will have an impact on what direction the war will take. There are also many unknowns regarding the economic and industrial side of it.
The level of training of the original invasion force also left much to be desired, but that didn't stop Russia from going after very ambitious objectives. Coupled with formations that are freed up from Kherson, we could potentially see new axes being (re)opened. Such attempts, or just the threat of such attempts, could also be used to divert and tie down Ukrainian forces, prehaps as an attempt to prevent a larger Ukrainian winter offensive.
Morale of the mobilized men is also an important factor, though one that is hard to quantify. With winter looming, coupled with high casualties, Russia will face many challenges in this respect. However, hoping for a complete collapse is a very poor planning assumption.
Belarus
The current Russian deployments to Belarus are, for now, looking more like training of reservists than preparations for a renewed offensive. However, there is a possibility that could change over time.
Hajun_BY, a group which monitors military activity in Belarus, has reported that all Russian military trains, arriving Since October 14th, has come from stations that indicates movement of elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army.1
The Ukrainian Center for Defense Studies reported this on November 8th2:
While it is too early to draw conclusions, to me the deployment of the 2nd MRD, to Belarus, in stead of e.g shoring up the defensive lines in northern Luhansk, may indicate there something more to this. The mobilization, with potential new units being raised, also adds uncertainty, while providing options for the Russian side.
The visibility of movements in Belarus is relatively good, so we will likely be able to accurately discern how this situation develops, as time goes by.
Kursk and Bryansk Oblasts
The current Russian groupings in these border oblasts doesn't represent much in terms of offensive capability, but are conducting cross border artillery strikes and reconnaissance. The mobilization has a potential to change this, so another area worth watching.
Current composition according to the CDS3:
The critical infrastructure campaign
The Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure has been more successful than I originally anticipated. If Russia does acquire Iranian ballistic missiles, then the result could be catastrophic for the Ukrainian power grid. The Warzone has a good article on this.
While this campaign is unlikely to undermine Ukraine’s will to fight, a country without electricity in wintertime, is a potential humanitarian disaster. The impact on Ukraine’s already strained economy is also likely significant.
It is hard to say how this could impact the frontline situation, but nevertheless I believe this strike campaign will have an influence on how the war develops.
Another aspect of this campaign is sustaining Ukrainian air-defences. As RUSI showed in their excellent report on the air war, the Russian Air Force still represents a serious threat. If Ukrainian SAM stockpiles gets depleted, this will enable the Russian Air Force to play a bigger role, potentially with significantconsequences.
Ukraine needs more modern Western systems, help in sustaining legacy systems and a cost-effective solution in countering the threat posed by systems such as the Shahed-136. For the latter, I believe large number of radar and optical directed AAA, and MANPADS, may be the best solution.
Western reluctance in providing long-range systems
Despite statements from Western officials, not providing long-range systems does restrict Ukrainian offensive capability. The introduction of HIMARS did have an effect on the battlefield, but Russia has adapted.
While this example is from Kherson, where frontline changes will enable Ukraine to reach new targets with current systems, this problem is also present in other sectors.
Caveats on not using Western supplied systems to strike targets inside Russia itself, exacerbates this. By not being able to reliably strike targets beyond tube artillery range, Ukraine is severely restricted when it comes to influencing Russian movements of troops, and logistics in bordering Oblasts.
If we do indeed see new Russian offensive groupings being formed in Bryansk or Kursk over the winter, not being able to blunt any buildup puts Ukraine at a disadvantage.
Yes, Russia will likely huff and puff, but Ukraine’s Western supporters should display courage in supplying long-range systems.
The recent dial-back of the nuclear rethoric, after clear Western statements on the consequences of potential nuclear use, very much indicates that Russia doesn't want to expand the war, as that would mean loosing. Therefore I believe supplying long-range systems won't bring us any closer to a NATO-Russia war.
Summing up
As Michael Kofman repeatedly says, everything in war is contingent, so therefore I haven't made any hard predictions on battlefield developments, beyond Russian forces ending up east of the Dnipro in Kherson.
There are many moving parts at the moment, mainly due to the Russian mobilization, which gives Russia several new options. Given the current state of the Russian Army, many may find the idea of Russia opening new fronts unlikely, but that doesn't mean we can rule any such moves out.
While Ukraine currently holds the initiative, there is likely much heavy fighting still ahead, and the war could potentially be a long one.
Regards
The Lookout
https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5753
https://defence.org.ua/dailybrief/2022-11-08/
https://defence.org.ua/dailybrief/2022-11-08/